Boko Haram: Who's afraid of Foreign Terrorist Organisation designation?

Over two years after Boko Haram attacked the UN headquarters in Abuja, the question of whether the United States should designate them as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation has returned.

African Arguments has published a good assessment of the situation by Christopher O’Connor of the National Endowment for Democracy.

He weighs the pros and cons of such a designation; there is a great desire from some quarters of Nigerian society for the US to do so, it would be a marked gesture for the US to “call a spade a spade”. 

But there has also been a concerted lobbying attempt form foreign observers to hold off on making a full declaration of FTO status. These observers say, and O’Connor agrees, that it will make a peace settlement harder.

Last year the US Department of State compromised. Instead of putting full FTO status before Congress (which Congress would have likely approved), it placed sanctions on key Boko Haram and splinter group Ansaru leaders as individuals. 

Congress is now looking to raise thequestion of FTO designation again, after another spate of violence.

But I think the African Arguments piece has missed a key point about FTO designation.

On the face of it, its hard to see why Boko Haram aren't on the list already. If organisations like Kahane Chai and Aum Shinrikyo are on it, why would the Obama administration shy away from Boko Haram?

Could it really have been that the objections of a well meaning group of Nigeria watchers was sufficient to prevent the White House pursuing Foreign Terrorist Organisation designation for Boko Haram?

The US Department of State might have had to listen to the wishes of another party who has a say in this –the Nigerian government themselves.

Why would the Federal Government of Nigeria object to the US designating Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation? 

As O’Connor says, FTO designation is not just a matter of calling a spade a spade. It is a legal definition that triggers a list of things that would suddenly come under the purview of the US Congress, among them is tight restrictions on international funding of the group.

Its not hard to see why the Government will not be entirely enthusiastic about this renewed question of FTO designation. What effect would it have on the government's plan for an "amnesty" for Boko Haram? The plan is along the same lines as it abated militants in the oil producing south, ie shovel cash at them and hope the problem will go away.

Wouldn't it scupper it completely?

Many people have questioned if this amnesty will be effective in its stated aims. They warn the river of cash could be diverted. But with a serious split in the ruling party troubling the PDP as the 2015 elections loom, who's to say that the stated aims are what they say they are?

The Nigerian government really hasn't had a lot to say on the record about Foreign Terrorist Organisation status. 

Last year, in one of the only public pronouncements on the FTO matter by a Jonathan-administration insider, then Ambassador to the US Adebowale Adefuye indicated to the Nigerian media that the Federal Government itself was resisting the designation.

Reports quoted him as saying designation might “add to Nigerians woes when travelling through international airports”.

Longtime watchers of Nigerian politics know this is a kind of dog-whistle phrase. Something that might impede travelling through airports is certainly eye-catching to Nigeria’s big men.

Designation of FTO status would clearly necessitate closer scrutiny of financial flows in and out of Nigeria. This would not only be in connection with Boko Haram specifically, but almost certainly have to take in Nigeria in general.

Put it this way:

The question is not what effect designation would or would not have on Boko Haram.

The real question is: “who is it moving the most suspect money in and out of Nigeria; Boko Haram or… who?”

"If you Tarka me, I go Daboh you"

Godwin Daboh Adzuana will be remembered for a great contribution to Nigerian Pidgin.

Mr Daboh, who died last week, was a Nigerian political godfather, acting behind the curtain, sticking his fingers in many pies.

But back in the days when military leader Yakubu Gowon was in charge, in fact it was just before he was deposed in a coup, Daboh was a relatively unknown businessman from Benue state.

Gowon's publicity man Joseph Tarka had made an announcement that the government encouraged people to report corrupt officials.

Daboh took the opportunity to do exactly that, and provided information that Tarka was as bent as every other six-bob note in the government.

Tarka was forced to resign, and so the phrase "If you Tarka me, I go Daboh you" was born.

Daboh didn't do what he did out of a sense of moral probity, however.

How about this for a scorching obit.

The phrase encapsulates that old military-era problem, which has unfortunately hung over into today's Nigerian society: Everyone is up to their neck in it, if you try and dunk me, I'll pull you under.

Stop proceeds of crime being banked in Britain: Open letter to the UK government

Here is the text of an open letter sent by the undersigned organisations to the British Government trying to give voice to the story silenced by the abrupt end of the Ibori trial: the relationship between British banks and corrupt officials from foreign governments.

Tuesday 20th March 2012

TO:

Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP

The Home Secretary, Rt Hon. Theresa May MP

Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe, Metropolitan Police Service

Adair, Lord Turner, Chairman & Hector Sants, Chief Executive Officer, Financial

Services Authority

Rt Hon. Malcolm Bruce MP, Chair, International Development Select Committee

Rt Hon. Meg Hillier MP, Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Nigeria

We, the undersigned, would like to congratulate the Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police Service’s Proceeds of Corruption Unit (POCU) on the successful prosecution of James Onafene Ibori, former Governor of Delta State, Nigeria. We welcome the support for this action from the British government, and particularly the Department for International Development.

Mr Ibori was convicted on seven separate charges of money-laundering; one charge of conspiracy to commit money-laundering; one charge of conspiracy to defraud; one

charge of conspiracy to make false instruments; and one charge of property transfer by deception. For these charges he could expect to face ten years in prison.

Mr Ibori’s trial has documented the huge sums of money which prosecutors at Southwark Crown Court testified to have been stolen from the public exchequer over the period ofhis terms in public office; £35 million of UK assets traced to him were frozen in 2007, and in total he may have laundered as much as £160 million, according to prosecutors.

Alongside that, the trials of Ibori and his associates show that he amassed luxury cars and a property portfolio in two continents including a London mansion bought for £2.2 million in cash.

Corruption is a huge drain on the economies of developing nations such as Nigeria.

This type of prosecution, consistent with Articles 43-50 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, is enormously important in that it sends a signal that breaking domestic and international laws by stealing public money and using it for private gain and accumulation overseas will not be tolerated. Such international law-enforcement

cooperation is essential if the fight against corruption in Nigeria, and in other developing nations, is to move forward.

Equally, it is important to British taxpayers, who fund the UK’s commitments as a

longstanding and core development partner in Nigeria. It is also important for the UK to show that investments from proceeds of corruption in other parts of the world are not welcomed.

The UK has made progress on this issue in the five years since the Financial Action Task Force listed the UK as only partially compliant on customer due diligence in financial services, with important new money laundering regulations coming into force in 2007.

However, there are serious concerns about how well banks are actually implementing

these rules. In the banking sector, too many financial institutions seem to be paying little heed to their obligations under know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering legislation. A June 2011 report by the Financial Services Authority found that:

• Three-quarters of banks sampled failed to take adequate measures to establish

the legitimacy of the source of wealth and source of funds to be used in the

business relationship;

• More than half failed to apply meaningful Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)

measures in higher risk situations and did not identify or record adverse

information about the customer or the customer’s beneficial owner;

• More than a third of banks visited failed to put in place effective measures to

identify customers as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

In addition, James Ibori’s huge property portfolio points us to the key role of the realestate sector and estate agents in helping to prevent money-laundering. The attractive location and prices of the UK property market continue to attract international investment, which sadly includes laundered money.

Following the EU’s Third Money-Laundering Directive (2005/60/EC), implemented in the UK as the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, other economic actors in nonfinancial activities and professions, including lawyers, notaries, accountants, estateagents, have a responsibility to require 'enhanced due diligence' measures for new and existing customers that are 'politically exposed persons'.

Crucially, these require identification of beneficial owners and the verification of the

beneficial owner's identity. Yet the Ibori conviction raises questions about the checks

taken to comply with these regulations by many of the financial intermediaries that he dealt with, including real-estate agents. How did these institutions ensure that the funds they were handling were not the proceeds of corruption?

The Ibori case has also revealed how corrupt politicians can use shell companies to hold their assets, and in some cases hide their identity. For example, IborI’s lawyer, Badresh Gohil, who has also been convicted of money laundering, helped Ibori buy a $20 million Bombadier private jet through a number of shell companies.

We therefore urge the British government, financial services regulators, law enforcement and anti-corruption bodies, financial, legal and real-estate professional associations, and private-sector financial bodies, vendors, agents and purchasers of real-estate, to take note of these issues and implement actions including:

• Devoting more law-enforcement time and investigative efforts to prosecutions

such as that of James Ibori;

• Educating real-estate and financial services actors as to their legal obligations as

regards money-laundering;

• Working with professional associations in the real-estate, legal and financial

services sector to establish, disseminate and train on best-practice in combating

risk from money-laundering;

• Continuing to monitor market actors’ implementation of anti-money-laundering

controls, especially as regards politically exposed persons, and sanctioning those

who do not take compliance efforts seriously;

• Rigorously enforcing the anti-money laundering regulations by carrying out spot

checks on the regulated sector, and where wrongdoing is identified undertaking

prosecution, including in the most serious cases, for an imprisonable offence;

• Introducing greater transparency over the ownership of shell companies by

requiring companies to disclose their ultimate (or beneficial) owner to Companies

House so that this information is in the public domain;

• Support the Nigerian Government to strengthen its anti-corruption institutions and

prosecution systems to ensure that future cases of money laundering do not slip

through its system.

We feel that such measures will underline Britain’s seriousness in combating the

globalised menace of corruption and money-laundering, and send a strong deterrent

signal across the world.

Yours sincerely,

Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja, Nigeria

Christian Aid, London, UK

Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, Abuja, Nigeria

CLEEN Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria

Constitutional Reform Dialogue Mechanism (CRDM), Abuja, Nigeria

Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) Nigeria

Global Witness, London, UK

Kayode Ogundamisi, Nigeria Democratic Forum, UK

Modupe Debbie Ariyo, OBE, Africans Unite Against Child Abuse, London/Manchester,

UK Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation, Europe

Nigerian Gender Budget Network, Abuja, Nigeria

Oliver Owen, St Cross College, Oxford, UK

Paul Okojie, Department of Law, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK

Platform, London UK

Revenue Watch Institute, New York, USA

Richard Wild, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, UK

Stakeholder Democracy Network, Port Harcourt, Nigeria/London, UK

Tax Justice Network, London, UK

Tearfund, London, UK

The Corner House, Dorset, UK

Transparency International UK, London, UK

Youth Action Initiative Africa (YAIA), Jos, Nigeria

The collapse of James Ibori

It wasn't until a few minutes in to the hearing that I realised that I was about to witness the full and total collapse of James Onafene Ibori.

I had come to Southwark Crown Court expecting to see a jury selected and sworn in and then the lengthy process of trying the former governor of Delta State would begin.

The trial was scheduled to last for three months. Mr Ibori was going to call 58 witnesses, we'd been told. I was expecting a lavish and punctillious defence from "this generation's finest legal mind" Nicholas Purnell QC.

The jury would have access to a bundle of documents weighing several kilos, on which there would be the details of complicated financial interactions and money laundering schemes. I would not have access to that information. I'd have to keep up.

But then the prosecutor Sasha Wass QC started telling the judge that they had agreed a new indictment to be presented to Mr Ibori. Then it became clear that he was going to be arraigned on the charges involved in a second trial, not scheduled to begin until next year.

It could mean only one thing. He was planning to plead guilty.

Almost every hearing has been well attended by Ibori's supporters, but today people pressed in to the door in an unruly mob an hour before court was due to start.

When they were eventually let in, when the seats were full inside and the court clerk tried to those without a seat to leave they looked at him like he had just cursed their mothers.

"This is the reason Nigeria is poor," said one Nigerian spectator (a lawyer who had -she said- worked with trial judge Anthony Pitts when he was a prosecutor).

"So unruly, and look at the lack of respect for court officers!" she tutted.

When Ibori said the word "guilty", the atmosphere became leaden and heavy, but my heart was pumping.

After he said the word "guilty" ten times, the prosecutor declaimed James Ibori, calling him "effectively a thief in office, a pretender in government who had plundered the public purse."

I'd met James Ibori twice before. the first time at the People's Democratic Party convention in 2006, when he held "president (s)elect" Umaru Yar'Adua's hands aloft in victory -hours before a vote was cast in his favour.

The second time was in 2008 when Yar'Adua's 2007 election came to the Election Petition Tribunal. It had been a jam to get in there too, but everyone parted for James Onafene Ibori. He was wearing his immaculate white starch-pressed baban riga, blue cap and terrible green crocodile skin clogs -mirroring exactly the dress style of the president.

That James Ibori was not the James Ibori they led down to the cells.